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One of the crucial challenges of the Eighties is to maintain an open
and expanding international trade system. Despite the successful com-
pletion of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in
1979,' the liberal principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
* Partner, Wender, Murase & White, Washington, D.C.; Senior Research Fellow, Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University; Senior Fellow, International Law Institute, Ge-
orgetown University;, former Representative of the Ford Foundation in East Asia; Member, Dis-
trict of Columbia and New York Bars; A.B. (magna cum laude) 1961, Harvard College; J.D.,
1965, Yale University.
I The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was the seventh round of trade nego-
tiations held since 1948 under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed Oct. 30, 1947, entered intoforce Jan. 1,
1948,61 Stat. A 3, T.LA.S. No. 1700,55 U.N.T.S. 194. It was instituted officially upon the signing
of the Tokyo Declaration by ministers of more than 100 countries in September 1973. The negoti-
ations, which were much slower than expected, were formally completed on April 12, 1979, when
ministers from the developed countries and some developing countries initialed the results. See S.
REP. No. 249,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979), reprlntedin [1979] 6A U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
8 [hereinafter cited as S. Rm,.].
In American legal doctrine, the multilateral trade agreements (MTAs) reached in the Tokyo
Round are non-self-executing and thus do not have independent effect under U.S. law. See H.R.
REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. For a discussion of
non-self-executing international agreements see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES §§ 141-45 (1962). The substance of the MTAs was
incorporated into the laws of the United States through the instrumentality of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2501 et seq.
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Trade (GATT)2 are under increasing attack. Protectionism has become
increasingly prevalent in Europe and is mounting rapidly in the United
States. The principal targets of protectionism are Japan, the newly in-
dustrialized countries of Asia3 and the developing countries generally,
whose expanding exports represent serious challenges to traditional in-
dustrial sectors in the mature industrial countries. Unless the doors of
the trading "club" remain open to new entrants, there is great danger
that the system will break down into blocs, such as a Japan-centered
Asian bloc or an EEC-African bloc, or that it will collapse in a grim
replay of the 1930s.
The growing dangers of protectionism are still not generally recog-
nized, partly because protectionism has been successful in concealing
itself behind new and sophisticated masks. Euphemisms such as "fair
trade," "orderly marketing" and "voluntary restraints," which we will
examine below, have given a new cover of respectability to protection-
ism and hidden its inroads from public view. Schooled in the history of
an earlier era, we tend to associate protectionism with the high tariffs
and quotas of the past and to draw comfort from the relative absence of
such practices today. While the classical forms of protectionism have
been rendered largely obsolete by the GATT, protectionism itself has
not been defeated; rather, it has adapted itself to the new international
environment through a protean capacity to assume new forms.
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations was success-
ful in curtailing a variety of non-tariff barriers restricting international
trade.4 The Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs) that resulted from
the negotiations are designed to reduce or eliminate such non-tariff
forms of protectionism as overly restrictive product standards,5 domes-
(Supp. III 1979)). See generally deKieffer, GA7T Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in Inter-
national and U.S. Trade Law, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317 (1980).
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed Oct. 30, 1947, entered into force Jan. 1,
1948, 61 Stat. A 3. T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
3 The term "Asian NICs" is often used to refer to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. See S. OKITA, THE DEVELOPING ECONOMICS AND JAPAN: LESSONS IN GROWTH 271
(1980).
4 "The principle object of the Tokyo Round was the elimination, reduction, or 'harmoniza-
tion,' i.e., uniformity, of certain nontariff barriers (NTBs), although further tariff cutting was also
contemplated." S. Rep., supra note 1, at 2.
5 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (relating to product standards) entered into
in Geneva, April 12, 1979. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMIT-
TING THE TEXTs OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MUL-
TILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, PURSUANT TO SECTION 102 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, H.R.




tic purchase requirements in government procurement,6 questionable
standards and procedures in customs valuation 7 and restrictive import
licensing.8 The MTAs also advance the harmonization 9 of laws among
trading countries with respect to trade distortions such as dumping'0
and subsidies." But despite these successes, 2 other forms of protec-
tionism continue to grow. My focus in this Perspective is on two such
forms of the new protectionism which, for convenience, I have desig-
nated "bilateralism" and "legal protectionism."
BILATERALISM
During the 1930s, unilateral import quotas, often of a highly dis-
criminatory nature, were commonly used to protect domestic indus-
tries. Unlike tariffs, which represent a hurdle that can be surmounted
by more efficient lower-cost producers, quotas generally place an abso-
lute bar on trade expansion. When the GATT negotiators set about to
reshape the international trade system after World War II, they took
special aim against the use of quotas by agreeing to a general prohibi-
tion of quantitative restrictions. Article XI(l) of the GATT 3 provides:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,
whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on
the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for
the territory of any other contracting party.
Although prohibiting in general the unilateral imposition of quantity
restrictions by contracting parties, Article X is silent about consensual
6 The Agreement on Government Procurement, done Apr. 11, 1979, GATT Doe. MTN/
NTM/W/21 1/Rev. 2, reprinted in Transmission of the Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 69.
7 The Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (relating to customs valuation), done April 12, 1979, GATT Doe. MTN/NTM/W/192/
Rev. 5, reprinted in Transmission of the Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 3.
8 The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, done Apr. 10, 1979, GATT Doe. MTN/
NTM/W/231/Rev. 2, reprinted in Transmission of the Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 191.
9 See note 4 supra.
10 The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (relating to antidumping measure), done Apr. 9, 1979, GATT Doe. MTN/NTM/W/232,
reprinted in Transmission of the Trade Agreements, supra note 5, at 309.
11 The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (relating to subsidies and countervailing measures),
done Apr. 9, 1979, GATT Doe. MTN/NTM/W/232, reprinted in Transmission of the Trade
Agreements, supra note 5, at 257.
12 Other MTAs deal with trade in agricultural products and other specific industries that are
outside of the scope of this Perspective.
13 GATT, supra note 2, art. XI(1).
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arrangements having the same effect. 4 Through the use of this "loop-
hole" a considerable and growing portion of international trade has
become subject to quantity restrictions.' 5 Whether trade restricting
agreements, particularly those negotiated between highly industrialized
importing countries and less developed exporting countries, are truly
consensual in substance, as opposed to form, may indeed be ques-
tioned. Nonetheless, the widespread use of such arrangements has
given them a certain measure of legitimacy.
A fundamental objection to bilateral arrangements is that, by their
nature, they undercut the GATT's basic principle of non-discrimina-
tion.'6 A trade restricting agreement between an importing country
and any one exporting country is inherently discriminatory. In this re-
spect, bilateralism is perhaps worse than quotas, which, in principle,
may be equitably apportioned among exporting countries in accord-
ance with the shares which they might be expected to obtain in the
absence of such restrictions. 7 But because in consensual arrange-
ments, the exporting country "agrees" to be discriminated against, it
thereby relinquishes any basis for crying "foul play."
The most comprehensive set of bilateral restraints are those ap-
plied to the textile and clothing exports of less developed countries
under the Multifibre Agreement of 197418 (MFA) which, though multi-
lateral in appearance, consists, in fact, of a worldwide network of sepa-
rate bilateral arrangements. Textile and clothing manufacturing,
because of its usually labor-intensive nature, typically has been the
"take off" industry for low wage developing countries seeking to ex-
14 Professor John Jackson notes that "it has been argued that these arrangements are techni-
cally illegal under the GATT, but in general these arguments have had little effect." Jackson, The
Birth ofthe GAT-MTN Systen: A ConstitutionalAppraisal, 12 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 21, 31 n.49
(1980).
15 As Olivier Long, former Director-General of GATT, has asserted, "[ilt is difficult to arrive
at even an approximate measure of the restrictions imposed. They vary greatly and are frequently
unpublicized. That they are extensive is obvious. ... Long, International Trade Under Threat."
A Constructive Response, 1 THE WORLD ECON. 251, 252 (1978).
16 Article XIII of the GATT, which embodies the principle of non-discrimination, provides in
part as follows:
I. No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the
like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like product to all third countries is
similarly prohibited or restricted.
GATT, supra note 2, art. XIII.
17 Id. art. XIII(2).
18 Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, done Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840, extendedby Protocol of Feb. 1, 1978. See generally Perlow, The Multilat-




pand their industrial base and to improve their balance of payments
through exports. 9 It has therefore attracted many new entrants. In
accordance with the economic theory of comparative advantage,20 the
world economy would benefit if mature industrial countries ceded this
industry to developing countries and concentrated their resources in
more capital-and technology-intensive industrial sectors. But in prac-
tice, most industrial countries have been slow to do so, preferring in-
stead to protect their domestic textile industries through restrictions on
imports from developing countries:
The Multifibre Agreement had its origins in the Short Term Ar-
rangement of 196121 and the Long Term Arrangement of 1962,22 both
of which applied to cotton textiles. Originally these were intended to
be temporary measures needed to allow time for phase-out adjustments
to take place in the developed countries.' Their persistence is evidence
of the difficulty of pursuing adjustment and protection at the same
time. The Multifibre Agreement, though incorporated in the GATT
arrangements, flouts the spirit, if not the letter of Article XI's prohibi-
tion of quantity restrictions; it is also highly discriminatory since the
restrictive bilateral agreements negotiated under it generally restrict
only the textile and clothing exports of less developed countries. The
negotiations for extension of the MFA taking place this year will deter-
mine whether this restrictive regime expands or contracts.2 4 With pro-
tectionist sentiment continuing to grow in the developed countries, the
negotiations promise to be long and hard.
Japan and the newly industrialized countries such as Korea, Tai-
wan, Singapore and Hong Kong have posed the sharpest competitive
challenges to European and American industries and have been among
the most frequent targets of bilateral restraints.' It is impossible to
19 See Perlow, supra note 18, at 93-94.
20 A brief discussion of the theory of comparative advantage is presented in A. LOWENFELD,
PUBLIC CoNrRoLs ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3-9 (1979).
21 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Arrangements Regarding International Trade in
Cotton Textiles, July 21, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1675, T.I.A.S. No. 4884.
22 Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1963,
13 U.S.T. 2673, T.LA.S. No. 5240, extendedby Protocol of May 1, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 1337, T.I.A.S.
No. 6289 and June 15, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 6940.
23 Article I of the Long-Term Arrangements states, ". . . the participating countries are of the
opinion that it may be desirable to apply, during the next few years, special practical measures of
international cooperation which will assist in any adjustment that may be required by changes in
the pattern of world trade in cotton textiles." Id.
24 See Lalith, Forthcoming Negotiations on the Multi-FibreArrangement, 3 THE WORLD ECON.
1 (1980).
25 Japan is often described as a practitioner rather than a mere target of protectionism. The
recent report to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan by the Japan-
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gauge the extent of European restrictions against the exports of these
countries since the restrictive arrangements are generally informal and
usually secret. It is widely understood that such arrangements cover a
variety of industrial products including, inter alia, steel, ships,
automobiles and consumer electronics.2 6 While many of these restric-
tions are imposed by "agreement," there are also many that are im-
posed by unilateral actions in clear disregard of GATT rules. A survey
on automobile trade released by the United States Department of
Commerce in June 1980 showed, for example, that France has kept
Japanese automobile imports to less than 3 percent of its market, that
Italy limited Japan to a mere 2,200 cars in 1980, and that the United
Kingdom, under a "gentlemen's agreement," limits imports of Japa-
nese cars to approximately 10 percent of its market.27
One of the principal aims of the Tokyo Round was to replace these
under-the-table arrangements with a new and more effective safeguards
system.28 Safeguards, that is, restrictions on imports that cause injury
to a domestic industry, are permissible as an emergency measure under
Article XIX of the GATT, subject to specified conditions.2 9 Article
XIX does not authorize departures from the GATT's principle on non-
discrimination: import restrictions adopted under the authority of Ar-
ticle XIX must apply to all foreign sources of a given product on a non-
discriminatory basis. Moreover, the country invoking Article XIX
must consult with the exporting countries affected and provide com-
pensation or face retaliation for its action. Because of these conditions
and limitations, the GATT's safeguard clause has been relatively little
used; most countries have simply bypassed it in favor of informal ar-
rangements for import restriction. 0 The effort made in the Tokyo
Round to negotiate a new, more workable safeguards provision ended
in failure as a result of unresolvable differences between protection-
United States Economic Relations Group (the "Wisemen Group") concludes, however, that Japan
"now is far more the victim of other countries' formal and informal quotas than a perpetrator of
quota restrictions in international trade in manufactured goods." REPORT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED
STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP ("WISEMEN'S REPORT") 57 (1981).
26 See Hindley, Voluntary Export Restraints and the G,4T's Main Escape Clause, 3 THE
WORLD ECON. 313, 316 (1980).
27 OFFICE OF INT'L SECTORAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF AUTOMOTIVE
TRADE RESTRICTIONS MAINTAINED BY SELECTED NATIONS 1-3 (1980).
28 See Hindley, note 26 supra.
29 Article XIX, § 2 of the GATT directs the party seeking to restrict imports to give advance
notice to the exporting party and to other exporters of the product. If delay would cause damage,
unilateral action may be taken, so long as it is followed immediately by consultation between the
parties. See note 2 supra.
30 On the inadequacies of the GATT's existing Safeguard Clause, see generally Tumlir, 4
Revised Safeguard Clausefor G,4T7M, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 404 (1973).
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minded European countries and less developed countries that feared a
more effective safeguards provision would be used too often against
them. 3
1
In the case of the United States, Section 1 of the Sherman Act,32
with its broad prohibition of agreements in restraint of trade, precludes
the industry-to-industry arrangements that often serve as informal safe-
guards in Europe. Under the so-called Escape Clause,33 a provision
based upon Article XIX of the GATT, the International Trade Com-
mission (ITC) is empowered to investigate claims by domestic indus-
tries that increased imports are a substantial cause of serious injury
and, in the case of an affirmative finding, to recommend that the Presi-
dent provide relief. The forms of relief authorized by the statute in-
elude the negotiation with foreign countries of orderly marketing
agreements (OMAs) 34 to limit imports of the product in question.
Under the authority of the Escape Clause, OMAs are currently in effect
covering a relatively small group of products including color televisions
from Korea and Taiwan, certain footwear, certain industrial fasteners
and various other items.35
During the 1960s and early 1970s the United States Government
negotiated voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs) 36 on steel and other
imports. The legality of such VRAs was called into serious question in
Consumers Union of the United States v. Kissinger,37 in which the con-
sumers group challenged the VRA negotiated in 1972 by the State De-
partment with foreign steel producers. The original complaint
31 See Corbet, The Importance of Being Ernest about Further GA7T Negotiations, 2 THE
WoRLD ECON. 319, 329-35 (1979).
32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
33 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, §§ 201-03 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
2251-53 (1976)).
34 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a)(4) (1976).
35 Products currently covered by OMAs are listed in the Tariff Schedules of the United States
("TSUS") Appendix 9, Part 2.A.
36 There is considerable overlap and confusion in the terms used to designate informal quanti-
ty restraints. Unlike OMAs which, by statutory definition, are agreements negotiated "with for-
eign countries," see note 34 infra, the term "voluntary restraint agreements" or "arrangements"
(VRAs) is used by some authorities to designate nongovernment to government arrangements,
such as the government to industry arrangements described in the Consumers Union case (see text
accompanying note 37 infra), and by others to embrace both those arrangements and OMAs. See
[1978] PROCEEDINGS AM. Soc. INT'L L. 1, 12 (remarks of John H. Jackson, Chairman, and Julius
L. Katz). The term voluntary export restraints (VERs) is frequently used in the context of the
Multifibre Agreement, see notes 21, 22 supra, to denote export restraints adopted pursuant to that
government agreement, but it is also used more generally to refer to all bilaterally negotiated
measures of export limitations. See Hindley, supra note 26, at 339 n.5. In Europe, bilateral re-
straint arrangements are generally known as "Selective Safeguards."
37 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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contained two separate claims: (1) that the VRA violated the Sherman
Act and (2) that the VRA was ultra vires the Executive Branch because
of failure to conform to the procedural requirements of the Escape
Clause. For reasons not stated in the record, plaintiff stipulated the
dismissal with prejudice of its antitrust claim and filed an amended
complaint limited to the second claim. Nevertheless, the District Court
observed in dictum that "very serious questions can and should be
raised as to the legality of the arrangements under the [Sherman]
Act."38 With respect to the ultra vires claim, the Court of Appeals con-
ceded that "Congress has by statute occupied the field of enforceable
restriction" but it, nevertheless, upheld the authority of the Executive
Branch to negotiate the VRA on the grounds that it was "essentially
precatory" and "non-binding."39
Bilateralism in the United States has now taken a great leap for-
ward with the recent conclusion of an arrangement to restrict imports
of Japanese automobiles.40 Detroit's demands for protection, which
were strongly supported in the Congress, 4' presented the Reagan Ad-
ministration with an early and crucial test of its professed commitment
to open markets and liberal trade. Pressure on the Administration was
compounded by a bill introduced by Senators Danforth, Bentsen and
others which would have imposed unilateral quotas on Japanese
automobiles 42 in clear violation of America's obligations under Article
XI(1) of the GATT and Article XIV of the Japan-United States Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.
43
The options available to the Administration were narrowly re-
stricted. The possibility of an Orderly Marketing Agreement, as au-
38 Id. at 140. In response to this dictum, Congress added to the Trade Act of 1974 a provision
specifically exempting the participants in the steel VRA from potential antitrust liability. See
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, § 607 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2485
(1976)).
39 506 F.2d at 143.
40 See Car Import Limit Eases U S. -Japan Trade Rift, Domestic Makers Gain Leeway to Boost
Prices, Wall St. L, May 4, 1981, at 3, col. 1. Generally, the plan called for Japan to limit for two
years auto exports to the United States. The parties would later consider a third year of limita-
tions. Shipments in the first year of the plan are to be held to 1,680,000 cars, compared with
1,820,000 units in 1980. Id.
41 Senator John Danforth (R-Mo.) and Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) introduced S. 396 on
Feb. 5, 1981. Reps. Robert Traxler (D-Mich.) and William Brodhead (D-Mich.) introduced H.R.
1823 on Feb. 6, 1981. These would have established auto import quotas. See [1981] 64 Ir'L
TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-2-5, M-1.
42 To Impose Quotas on the Importation ofAutomobilesfrom Japan During 1981, 1982, 1983, S.
396, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
43 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. 2863, Apr. 2, 1953. Article XIV(2) states:
2. Neither Party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of any
product of the other Party, or on the exportation of any product to the territories of the other
Party, unless the importation of the like product of, or the exportation of the like product to,
all third countries is similarly restricted or prohibited.
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thorized by the Escape Clause,44 had been eliminated in late 1980,
when the International Trade Commission heard and rejected Detroit's
claim for relief under that statute.45 Moreover, in the wake of Consum-
ers Union,' a VRA based on the voluntary cooperation of Japanese
exporters would clearly have raised serious antitrust risks both for the
exporters and for the U.S. officials who negotiated with them.47
The solution ultimately adopted is a piece of legal legerdemain
involving an agreement which is not an agreement and restraints which
are both voluntary and mandatory at the same time. Since any re-
straint agreement between the United States and Japanese Govern-
ments which did not meet the statutory standards for an OMA would
probably be an ultra vires act under the Consumers Union rationale,48
the Administration carefully avoided using words such as "negotia-
tions" or "agreement" in describing its arrangements with Japan.4 9
The restraints adopted by Japan are "voluntary" (in the somewhat du-
bious sense in which that word is used in the contemporary interna-
tional trade context) so far as the Japanese Government is concerned
but are to be regarded as involuntary so far as the automobile manu-
facturers are concerned so that, if they are sued under the American
44 See note 33 supra.
45 Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, Report to the President;
Investigation No. TA-201-44 (I.T.C. Dec. 3, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 85,194 (1980). In their separate
opinions, all of the ITC Commissioners were in agreement that the increased imports were a cause
of serious injury to the domestic automobile industry. But the Escape Clause authorizes relief
only if the increased imports are "a substantial cause" of serious injury or threat thereof. Substan-
tial cause is defined to mean "a cause which is important and not less than any other cause."
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, § 201(b)(4) (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(b)(4) (1976)). Since a majority of the Commissioners found that other causes (e.g., the
overall decline in demand, a shift in consumer preferences toward smaller cars, etc.) were more
important causes of injury than increased imports, they were constrained to deny relief. 45 Fed.
Reg. 85,194 (1980).
46 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
47 The Attorney General of the United States, William French Smith, in a letter to United
States Trade Representative William E. Brock dated February 18, 1981, stated:
In summary, this Department believes that although the President has inherent legal author-
ity to negotiate directly with foreign governments to seek import restraints, where such nego-
tiations are implemented through voluntary private behavior serious antitrust risks arse.
Foreign or United States governmental "approval," "urging," or "guidance" of such behavior
cannot safely be relied on as a defense; if the foreign government does not provide'adequate
protection by mandating the restraints in a legally binding manner, private antitrust suits
could jeopardize the effective implementation of any agreements that are negotiated.
Letter from Atty Gen. Smith to U.S.T.R. Brock Concerning Relationship Between Voluntary Im-
port Restraints and U.S. Antitrust Law [hereinafter cited as Attorney General's Voluntary Re-
straint Letter], reprinted in [1981] 70 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at M-1.
48 The Attorney General's letter also states: "No authority [to negotiate an orderly marketing
agreement] currently exists with respect to automobiles." Id.
49 See Clyde H. Farnsworth, 4uto Talks with Japawn A Drama of Euphemisms, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 26, 1981, at D-1, coL 1 (city ed.).
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antitrust laws, they can claim the defense of foreign legal compulsion.50
There was some anomaly in the American demand that Japan im-
pose sanctions under its own law to enforce restrictions desired by the
U.S. in order to protect Japanese companies from American antitrust
suits. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government undertook to comply
with the American request by issuing directives to its automobile ex-
porters indicating the maximum number of exportable units and by
threatening to impose export licensing under an amended Export
Trade Control Order if the companies fail to adhere to the directives.5 1
To allay Japanese fears that this arrangement might not pass muster in
an antitrust action, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a letter indi-
cating its opinion that the arrangement would satisfy the conditions of
the legal compulsion defense. 2 On this basis the Department con-
cluded that the arrangement "would not give rise to violations of
American antitrust laws" and that American courts "would likely so
hold."53
It would be bold to speculate whether the latest view expressed by
the Justice Department will be the last word on the antitrust aspects of
the automobile arrangement. Since the question of antitrust violation
may be raised by private treble-damages plaintiffs before any federal
district court,54 the possibility of a contrary result can hardly be ruled
out. But aside from any antitrust questions surrounding the arrange-
ment, it was clearly a departure from the liberal trade principles which
the Reagan Administration espouses and it provided European coun-
tries an excuse to follow suit in imposing further bilateral restrictions
on Japanese exports.
It is difficult to say much that is positive about bilateralism. No
doubt quantitative restrictions on imports may be useful to help ease a
declining industry out of existence or to assist in the rehabilitation of an
50 Under the doctrine of foreign legal compulsion, United States courts "recognize an antitrust
defense for actions taken or compelled by a foreign sovereign within its territory." See U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JusTicE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS, reprinted in [1977] 266 II TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 54 (Feb. 1, 1977). See also Letter of
Att'y Gen. Smith to U.S.T.R. Brock, supra note 47, stating "we believe that if... . an agreement
[to reduce automobile exports] were formally mandated by a foreign government, the formal man-
date would provide a defense to any subsequent antitrust challenge."
51 See exchange of letters between Ambassador Yoshio Okawara of Japan and Attorney Gen-
eral William French Smith (May 7, 1981), reprinted in [1981] 70 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT
WEEKLY (BNA) at M-1.
52 Id.
53 Id. at M-2.
54 See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
55 See Paul Lewis, Europeans Welcome Auto Pact-Car Makers See Hope ofExport Limits by
Japan, N.Y. Times, May 4, 1981, at D-l, col. 6 (city ed.).
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industry experiencing serious short term problems. In such circum-
stances, temporary restraints, such as those authorized by the GATT's
Safeguard Clause56 or the United States Escape Clause,57 may be use-
ful. Unfortunately, under both those provisions, the legal tests on
which relief depends have more to do with injury and causality than
with prospects for adjustment or rehabilitation,5" and thus are not well
designed to distinguish appropriate cases for relief. If a new interna-
tional safeguards regime can be established under the GATT, it would
be desirable to link safeguard actions clearly with adjustment or reha-
bilitation requirements for the affected domestic industry, for example
by limiting the period in which emergency actions may be put into ef-
fect and by making restrictions degressive during that period. 9
In an interdependent world, bilateralism usually does not solve
trade problems; it merely shifts them onto others. Relief for one mar-
ket translates quickly into an import surge for another.60 Thus, what
consenting sovereign states do in private is a matter of general concern.
An international trade system fraught with bilateralism carries with it
all of the dangers of the "beggar my neighbor" practices of the 1930s.
LEGAL PROTECTIONISM
Perhaps the most sophisticated new form of protectionism is that
which masquerades as the defense of fair trade. The concepts of "fair
trade" and of its opposite, "unfair trade" are so elusive and subjective
that it has been all too easy for the defense of fair trade to become the
basis of a broad attack on foreign competition. The problem was suc-
cinctly put in a famous headline in The Economist reading: "I export;
he dumps."
The phenomenon which I have described as "legal protectionism"
may be defined as the use of the unfair trade laws to achieve broad
protectionist goals.6' It has been a phenomenon more prevalent in the
United States than in Europe, perhaps because the Europeans have
56 GATT, supra note 2, art. XIX.
57 See Trade Act of 1974,,19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1976).
58 See, ag., Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
59 See Hindley, supra note 26, at 337-39.
60 For example, in recent monthi European officials have warned Japan against restraining
automobile exports to the United States, N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1980, § D, at 8, col. 1, and American
officials have warned the Japanese against restraining exports to Europe, Jafpanese-ECAuto Talks
Concern U.S., J. OF COMM., Jan. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 3. Once the agreement was set into place,
various EEC countries warned that their countries should not be used as alternative markets for
autos. Japan agreed not to sell in the United States. See [1980] 76 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IM-
PORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-4.
61 See Green, Legal Protectionism in the United States and Its Impact on United States-Japan
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been less constrained in applying informal quantity restrictions of the
kind we have described as "bilateralism." In contrast to those quota-
like arrangements, the weapons of legal protectionism, particularly
countervailing duty and antidumping actions, resemble tariffs in that
they discourage imports through exerting upward pressure on prices,
for example by limiting the period in which emergency actions may be
put into effect and by making restrictions depressive during that pe-
riod.6 2
The basic unfair trade laws of the United States, the counter-
vailing duty law63 and the antidumping law' are themselves of vener-
able age, but their expanded use as general instruments of protec-
tionism is largely a development of the late 1970s. Following the de-
feat of the Burke-Hartke bill,65 which would have protected the United
States market with a comprehensive set of quotas and high tariffs of the
classical variety, the steel industry and other protection-minded groups
undertook a massive advertising and lobbying campaign attacking "un-
fair trade" by foreign competitors and demanded more vigorous en-
forcement of the unfair trade laws. This campaign bore fruit in the
1974 Trade Act 66 which expanded and strengthened the remedies
available to domestic industries to cope with both "fair" and "unfair"
import competition.6 7
Economic Relations, Appendix to the Report of the Japan-United States Economic Relations
Group, April, 1981.
62 See Hindley, supra note 26, at 337-39.
63 §§ 701-707 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amendedby the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)-(f) (Supp. 111 1979)). The
United States' first comprehensive countervailing duty law was enacted as part of the Tariff Act of
1897, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151 (1897).
64 §§ 731-740 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673(a)-(i) (Supp. III 1979), (which repealed the Antidumping Act of 1921).
65 The Foreign Trade and Investment Act (popularly known as the Burke-Hartke bill) was
originally introduced in 1971, see S. 2592, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (by Sen. Hartke); H.R.
10914, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (by Rep. Burke).
66 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1974) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2201 etseq. (1976)).
67 The innovations of the 1974 Act are too numerous to catalogue, but the following examples
illustrate the thrust of the legislation:
(1) A new provision, section 301 of the Act, was added to give the President sweeping au-
thority to take "all appropriate and feasible steps within his power to obtain the elimination
of [foreign] restrictions and subsidies." 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (1976);
(2) The standard of causality between increased imports and seriolis injury for purposes of
the Escape Clause (§§ 201-203 of the Act) was lowered from "major factor" to "a substantial
cause." 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976);
(3) The applicability of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, providing for the exclusion of
products which are the subject of "unfair import practices" was expanded, 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(1930), as amended by § 341 of the 1974 Act. See also Note,A, Roadmap to the Trade Act, 8
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus., 125, 174-76 (1976); and
(4) The countervailing duty law was extended to apply to duty-free goods as well as goods
subject to duties. See id. at 171-72.
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Legal protectionism was given a further boost by President
Carter's handling of the steel import crisis of 1977. In response to the
rapidly rising imports of foreign steel that followed the expiration of
the VRAs described in Consumers Union,68 the American steel industry
made urgent demands on the Administration for new quantitative re-
straints. Because of its concern about the international consequences of
such outright protectionist action, the Administration resisted these
pressures. Instead of leaving the domestic industry empty-handed,
however, the President made a statement sharply attacking unfair trade
practices by foreign steel manufacturers and pledging more vigorous
enforcement of the antidumping laws.69 President Carter went so far as
to charge the Treasury with a "derogation of duty" in having failed to
enforce adequately the antidumping law.7 0 In effect, the President con-
verted the industry's demand for quantity restraints into a strategy for
limiting imports through the price mechanism.71
Legal protectionism was further enhanced by Congress in the
Trade Agreements Act of 197972 through the enactment of various pro-
visions designed to make the unfair trade laws more "effective." These
included provisions limiting the discretion of the Commerce Depart-
ment to reject petitions for relief,7' easing the standards of evidence
necessary to support petitions,' and reducing the amount of time avail-
able for investigations. 71 In explaining these changes the House Com-
mittee on Ways and Means stated: "[tihe Committee feels very
strongly that both the countervailing and antidumping duty laws have
been inadequately enforced in the past' 76 and it urged "strong, aggres-
sive and vigorous enforcement of the U.S. unfair trade practices law"
in the future.77
68 See note 37 supra.
69 See Marks, Remedies to 'Unfair Trade" American Action Against Steel Imports, 3 THE
WoRLD EcoN. 223, 228 (1978).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 229.
72 See H.R. REP. supra note I, at 51.
73 Id. "The Committee expects that the Authority will act upon most petitions, rejecting only
those which are clearly frivolous, not reasonably supported by the facts alleged or which omit
important facts which are reasonably available to the petitioner." Id.
74 See S. REP., supra note 1, to accompany H.R. 4537 at 47 (countervailing duties) and at 61
(antidumping duties).
75 H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 48.
76 Id. at 51.
77 Id.
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THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
To describe the workings of legal protectionism, we must sketch in
a rough outline of the unfair trade laws. The Countervailing Duty
law78 imposes duties on imported goods where the production, exporta-
tion or sale of those goods has benefited from foreign subsidies. In
most cases, the importation must also be found to cause material injury
to a domestic industry.7 9 The amount of the countervailing duty is cal-
culated to offset the effects of the subsidy.
80
The MTA on countervailing measures concluded in the Tokyo
Round was designed to harmonize countervailing duty laws among the
GATT countries,8' but there remain important differences between the
underlying philosophy of the U.S. law and of the MTA. The latter
distinguishes between "export subsidies," which are flatly prohibited,82
and "subsidies other than export subsidies" which the MTA signatories
recognize as "important instruments for the promotion of social and
economic policy objectives and [which the signatories] do not intend to
restrict .. ."I3 The United States countervailing duty law does not
make this distinction. It treats all subsidies affecting the production,
exportation or sale of imported goods as "unfair trade."' Under
United States law, for example, "the provision of capital, loans or loan
guarantees on terms inconsistent with commercial considerations" is a
potentially countervailable subsidy.85 Of course, the United States
government itself provides many such subsidies routinely to small busi-
ness, minority business, rural business and on occasion to industrial
giants such as Lockheed and Chrysler. Normally we do not think of
these non-export subsidies as unfair trading when provided by the
United States. We benefit from the fact that our trading partners gen-
erally do not condemn or countervail against such subsidies, even
though we would countervail against them if practiced by others.
78 See note 62 supra.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See note 11 supra.
82 Id. art. I.
83 Id. art. XI.
84 See S. REP., supra note 1, at 37, stating:
Subsidies and dumping are two of the most pernicious practices which distort international
trade to the disadvantage of United States commerce. Subsidies are bounties or grants be-
stowed (usually by governments) on the production, manufacture, or export of products,
often with the effect of providing some competitive advantage in relation to products of an-
other ountry .... Id.
85 Section 771(5)(B)(i) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by the Trade Agreement Act of




For some time during the 1970s it appeared that the American
countervailing duty law might become applicable to a very wide range
of imported products. In 1977, the United States Customs Court ruled
that the Japanese practice of remitting its commodity tax on exported
products constituted a countervailable subsidy under American law.86
Japan's practice, which is similar to that followed by many European
countries, is specifically exempted from countervailing by Article VI(4)
of the GATT.87 A major international trade dispute was averted when
the judgment of the Customs Court was overturned by the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, whose reversal was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.8 This landmark case reduced somewhat the scope of
the American countervailing duty law as an instrument of legal protec-
tionism. But, the breadth of application of the U.S. countervailing duty
law, however, ensures that it will continue to play a major role in regu-
lating imports, particularly those from developing countries, which
often provide "subsidies" to attract and stimulate industrial invesment.
THE ANTIDUMPING LAW
If fairness is in the eye of the beholder in the matter of subsidies, it
is no easier to define in relation to what is called "dumping." In an
economic sense, dumping is simply price discrimination between differ-
ent national markets.89 Although the word "dumping" is rich in emo-
tive content, price discrimination as such is not an aberration in
international trade, but rather a normal and frequent occurence, often
reflecting differences in demand and supply factors in particular mar-
kets.90 Nevertheless, price discrimination causes material injury to in-
dustries in the importer's country, the provisions of the GATT permit
the imposition of antidumping duties.91 In the formulation used in
United States law, imported goods sold at "less than fair value" which
cause or threaten to cause "material injury" to a domestic industry are
subject to dumping duties equal to the amount by which the foreign
86 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (C.D.), rev'd, 562 F.2d 1209 (Ct.
Cust. App. 1977), ae'd by a unanimous court, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
87 Article VI(4) of the GATT, supra note 2, states:
No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall be subject to antidumping or countervailing duty by reason of the
exemption of such product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the refund of such duties
or taxes. Id.
88 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
89 See G. BRYAN, TAXING UNFAIR INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRACTICES 34 (1980).
90 Id.
91 GATT, supra note 2, art. VI().
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market value of the goods exceeds the United States price.9 2
The policy behind the antidumping law, like that of its domestic
analogue, the Robinson-Patman Act,93 might be described as the pro-
tection of competitors rather than the protection of competition. The
social utility of the policy is a controversial question. Those who view
the interests of consumers as the paramount concern of market regula-
tion would clearly find the policy of the antidumping law objectiona-
ble. Policy questions aside, however, what makes the antidumping law
disastrously bad as law is its extraordinary complexity, technicality and
uncertainty. It is, to begin with, exceedingly difficult to compare sales
prices of "such or similar merchandise" in different markets.94 The
products may differ because of varying consumer preferences, varying
safety or performance standards or other market-specific factors. Dif-
ferences in distribution practices, warranty obligations and a variety of
other factors complicate price comparisons. Freely floating exchange
rates compound these complexities.
In addition to such factual problems, difficult legal issues arise in
the determination of "fair value." Sales in the home market provide a
starting point for such a determination, but if the Department of Com-
merce decides that there are not sufficient home market sales to form
an adequate basis for comparison, it may look, at its option, to third
country sales, 95 or to a "constructed value" that contains within it vari-
ous arbitrary elements." 96 Under a 1974 amendment to the law, home
market sales may be disregarded where they are below cost over an
extended period of time.9 7 Leaving aside the great difficulties in deter-
mining "cost," the 1974 amendment can have the paradoxical result
that dumping may be found where United States prices are higher than
cost and higher than average prices in the home market. 98
92 § 731 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. III 1979)).
93 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1936).
94 § 773(a)(1)(A) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b (Supp. III 1979)).
95 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(1)(B) (Supp. III 1979).
96 § 773(a)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). Constructed
value is computed under the statute on the basis of estimated costs of production, packing and
freight but also includes minimum percentages for "general expenses" (not less than 10% of costs)
and constructed profit (not less than 8% of the sum of general expenses and cost). § 773(2)(1)(B)
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93
Stat. 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
97 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
98 Matthew Marks provides the following example:
. . . [Assume] cost in the home market is 10. Seventy-five per cent of the merchandise sold in
the home market is at a price of 8 and the remainder at a price of 12. An average home-
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Further, the question of what constitutes "material injury" opens
up additional uncertainties.99 Despite the efforts of some International
Trade Commissioners to establish clear guideposts in their written
opinions, the factors considered and the weights assigned to those fac-
tors would appear to vary considerably from Commissioner to Com-
missioner and from case to case.
These complexities, arbitrary rules and uncertainties make the an-
tidumping law highly unpredictable. This unpredictability is itself a
major trade barrier; the inability of buyers and sellers to know in ad-
vance whether antidumping duties may apply to a transaction has a
chilling effect on trade. The chilling effect is aggravated by the fact
that, in some circumstances, the law permits antidumping duties to be
applied retroactively." Moreover, the penalties for misjudging the ap-
plicability of the law are not limited necessarily to antidumping duties.
In some cases, both antidumping duties and countervailing duties may
be applied to the same product. 10' Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930,102 a broadly worded statute providing injunctive relief and heavy
civil penalties for "unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States" may also be applicable,
in certain circumstances, to dumping cases. 10 3 If predatory intent can
market price is derived by weighing the two prices by the volume sold at those prices, yielding
an average home price of 9 in this case.
Prior to the enactment of the 'sales below cost' provision a sale in the United States at 9
would not have been below 'fair value.' Under the new 'sales below cost' provision, however,
there would be, under the same facts, a dumping margin of 3, for the sales in the home
market at 8' must be ignored, because they are below cost, and the home market price would
therefore be calculated at 12.
Marks, supra note 67, at 231.
99 Prior to enactment of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, the U.S. antidumping law re-
quired only a finding of "injury" to sustain imposition of antidumping duties. The inclusion of
the requirement of "material injury" was one of the major concessions sought from the United
States by its trading partners in the Tokyo Round. During consideration of the Act by Congress,
representatives of U.S. trading partners argued that the word 'material" means "important, signif-
icant, substantial" Congress rejected this formula however, and defined "material injury" to
mean "harm which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant" See § 771(7)(A) of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amendedby Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144
(1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (Supp. III 1979)). See Marks, Recent Changes in4meri-
can Law on Regulatory Trade Measures, 2 THE WORLD ECON. 427-30 (1980).
100 Section 733(e) of the Tariff Act of 1930 as amendedby Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat 144 (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1673(e) (Supp. HI 1979)).
101 Id.
102 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (Supp. I 1979).
103 See, eg., Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, 43 Fed. Reg. 8304 (I.T.C. Determi-
nation and Action), disapproved by President, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,789 (1978). In § 1105 of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Congress amended § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 to provide that the
ITC should not utilize § 337 with respect to matters that are "based solely on alleged acts and
effects which are within the purview of [the antidumping and countervailing duty laws]" but left
open the possible use of § 337 where additional allegations are present.
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be found, antitrust-type criminal penalties and treble damage remedies
may be applicable under the antidumping provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1916.1'4 Indeed, actions under all of the -above statutes were
brought against Japanese television manufacturers over the course of
the last decade, all premised on the basic allegation of unreasonably
low prices.10 5
Unfortunately for the foreign manufacturer, escaping the snares of
the antidumping law is itself risky. An agreement or understanding
among foreign firms to keep their prices from falling below "fair value"
would fall squarely within the Sherman Act's prohibition of price
fixing. 10 6 Similarly, an effort to reduce trade frictions through volun-
tary export restraints may also bring foreign firms into violation of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. 1 7 Thus the hapless foreign firm may be
caught between the Scylla of trade laws and the Charybdis of antitrust
actions.
The Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM),108 which the Carter Admin-
istration fashioned for the steel industry, represents one of the more
extreme cases of protectionist use of the unfair trade laws. Under the
TPM, the United States government is committed to investigate sales of
foreign steel for antidumping or countervailing duty law action when-
ever sales are made at less than the trigger price, or whenever "surges"
in imports occur. 109 The trigger price, which is, in effect, a minimum
price for imported steel, is calculated on a quarterly basis by the Com-
merce Department, using the costs of production of Japanese steel. 110
As a result of adjustments made by the Commerce Department I to
the Japanese data, however, actual trigger prices may exceed the list
104 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1980).
105 See Dickey,A Guidefor Pricing Commodities to Enter the Commerce of the United States, 11
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 491, 508-10 (1979).
106 Price fixing is a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony Vac-
uum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1939).
107 Foreign firms that participate in a cartel that would otherwise be a per se violation of the
antitrust laws, may have a defense under the Act of State or foreign legal compulsion doctrines in
cases where their actions are compelled by a foreign sovereign acting within its jurisdiction. But
those doctrines are subject to various limitations and uncertainties. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, Case 6,
reprinted in [1977] 266 II TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) at 53-57 (Feb. 1, 1977). See also, note 50
supra.
108 Trigger Price Mechanism implemented Dec. 30, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,214, suspended Mar.
27, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,150, reinstated, Oct. 8, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,833 (1980).
109 The anti-surge provisions were introduced when the TPM was reinstated in October 1980,
45 Fed. Reg. 66,833, 66,835 (1980).
110 The costs of Japanese steel are used because the Japanese industry is considered "the
world's most efficient." 42 Fed. Reg. 65,215 (1977).
111 See 45 Fed. Reg. 66,834 (1980).
The New Protectionism
3:1(1981)
prices established by far less efficient domestic steel producers.112 De-
spite the plainly protectionist results of the TPM, its adoption has been
privately welcomed by some foreign steel producers, particularly in Ja-
pan,' 13 presumably not because they like having a minimum price im-
posed upon them, but because they prefer to cope with a known barrier
rather than with the multiple risks and uncertainties of the antidump-
ing law itself.
CONCLUSION
Despite the continuing liberalization of the rules of the interna-
tional trade system, protectionism in sopisticated new forms is becom-
ing more prevalent. Although disguised quota arrangements are still
less pervasive than the openly restrictive rules of the 1930s, the bilater-
alist trend is growing, and represents a serious threat to the future of
the system. This bilateralist trend tells us, among other things, that the
process of liberalization may have outpaced the adaptive capabilities of
the West's welfare and employment oriented economies. If so, doctri-
naire free trade answers will not suffice; we should, rather, set our
sights on a liberal trade system that takes into account the vulnerabili-
ties of developed countries as well as the legitimate aspirations of the
developing and newly industrialized countries. An essential constitu-
ent of such a system is an improved safeguards regime consistent with
the basic GATT principle of non-discrimination.
Legal protectionism presents an even knottier set of problems.
The members of the GATT have agreed upon the necessity of curbing
trade distortions such as dumping and subsidies, even though they still
disagree substantially on how such curbs should be applied. My criti-
cism of the unfair trade laws of the United States is not to deny the
existence of trade distortions; rather, it is to point out that those laws
can and do have the effect of chilling normal international trade. As a
matter of policy, those effects, the resulting costs to consumers and the
costs of administering the laws ought to be weighed against the benefits
of protecting domestic businesses from subsidized or dumped imports.
It is entirely reasonable to enforce unfair trade laws to the extent that
they help maintain the integrity of the liberal trade system; but, when
112 The Chairman of Germany's Thyssen AG Dieter Spethmann, was recently quoted as say-
ing: "In the Great Lakes and East Coast, our traditional sales markets, the trigger prices for the
first quarter for hot-rolled wired steel strips, cold-rolled steel sheets and zinc coated coils are up to
8% higher than the American prices ... . That's nothing other than protectionism." Wall St. J.,
Feb. 6, 1980, at 23, col. 1.
113 See [1980] 62 INT'L TRADE REP. U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) at A-4, 5.
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by being overly broad, arbitrary and unpredictable, the unfair trade
laws impede the workings of the system, it is time to rethink them.
